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Ownership of the Airspace
The Court of Appeals of the State of New York has
laid down the doctrine that the space above land is real
estate the same as the soil beneath, and that the law re-
gards empty space as if it were solid, inseparable from the
soil and protects it from hostile occupation accordingly.'
Doubtless to-day the question of ownership of the air-
space is one of but remote interest to the average person.
This lack of interest will be shortlived when airplanes,
dirigibles and other aircrafts become as numerous as were
motor cars a decade ago. That day is not far away. There
were over sixty-seven per cent more airplanes manufac-
tured in this country in 1927 than were manufactured in
the previous year and for the year 1928 there were about
five thousand airplanes produced. Furthermore there were
over thirty-nine millions of miles flown by aircrafts in the
United States during 1927,2 and over sixty-five millions in
1928. With improved safety factors receiving every at-
tention it will be only a matter of a few years before air-
planes will be used universally, as one uses a motor car
to-day; although not in the same volume that cars are now
in use, it is true. But as to numbers, the airplane total will
gain rapidly within the next few years on the number of
automobiles. The present average daily air mileage in the
United States is about ninety thousand miles. To-day the
airplane is one of the safest forms of travel. This state-
ment may doubtless cause some surprise and evoke at-
'Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N. Y. 486.
3Aircraft Year Book for 1928, 421,
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tempts of refutation. It is true nevertheless. In the United
States Government air mail service there was but one
pilot killed for every 1,413,381 miles flown in 1927. 3 In the
air transport service but one fatality for every 1,414,330
miles flown in the United States occurred in the same
period.3 Of the 52,934 passengers flown in schedule flying
in 1928 there were but thirteen fatalities. The dreaded
spin or spiral nose dive about which the average layman
has in the past heard so often is now a rarity in aerial
navigation. In fact there is now in wide general use a
type of commercial plane which it is claimed cannot spin
accidentally or otherwise. The plane, in place of taking
a spiral nose dive, when stalled will settle on an even keel
and under full control. There are many other safety feat-
ures in the conventional plane of to-day such as the slotted
wing but their enumeration is beyond the scope of this
article. In fact this digression was made merely to point
out the fact that the airplane is a safe vehicle of travel
and that its use is increasing so rapidly that it will be but
a short time when planes will be seen constantly in flight.
What then will be the extent of Mr. Average Citizen's in-
terest when he awakens from his lethargy to discover that
the airspace over his house and forty by one hundied feet
suburban plot is being traversed constantly by airplanes?
The presence of odors and noises, the occasional dropping
of. refuse and probably other objects on his property will
arouse him to a realization that his possible domains are
being used by others to whom he has not given any con-
sent, actively at least. True the Air Commerce Regula-
tion's air traffic rules require flight at a minimum height of
one thousand feet in congested areas and five hundred feet'
elsewhere but noise, odors, and refuse can penetrate both
distances. Furthermore in taking off from a small field
a plane must of necessity fly at lower altitudes over ad-
joining private property before gaining the minimum alti-
tude requirements of the traffic rules. If Mr. Average
8Aircraft Year Book for 1928, 119.
'Section 74 (g).
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Citizen is too deep in his slumber to be aroused by the
aforementioned occurrences, he and his hard working help-
mate may be greeted some morning by an embryo Lind-
berg, Chamberlin or Byrd crashing through their roof 'into
the sanctity of their boudoir.
The extent to which one's proprietorship in property
-extends upward, and downward, also, is expressed in the
ancient maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et
ad inferos. Translated the maxim means that he who owns
the soil also owns everything from the center of the earth
to zenith. The principle laid down finds its inception in the
Roman Law. Napoleon in formulating his famous code of
laws incorporated the maxim therein. 5 Likewise it is found
in modern civil codes, viz., that of Germany, Austria, Spain,
Portugal, Italy, Holland, Uruguay, Argentine, Mexico,
Japan and Switzerland. The provision in the German Code6
limits the exclusive right to the superincumbent airspace
and the extreme depth below the surface only to that part
thereof for which the owner may ever have any practical
use. The codes of the other nations mentioned also con-
tain a similar limitation. This is an important limitation
and should be borne in mind. Some of the states of the
Union have adopted the maxim as part of their civil codes,
notably California,7 and the doctrine laid down in the max-
im with some possible limitation is the common law of this
country and is supported by court decisions.8 This will be
discussed at more length later.
A better understanding of the whole problem may be
gathered- by going back about twenty-five years into the
history of the development of aeronautical law from that
time on with occasional glimpses much further back in
years.
In his Institutes, Justinian states that the air like the
sea is by natural right common to all. And in the latter
8Code Napoleon, Section 552.
6Section 905.
7Section 829.
8Ryan v. Ward, 48 New York 204.
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part of the sixteenth century Queen Elizabeth said, "The
use of the sea and the air is common to all." Justinian and
the great Queen of course had no prophetic vision of the
future of aerial navigation by modern aircraft, yet their
statements were the basis, to some extent at least, of the
so called doctrine of "freedom of the air" which was
strongly advocated in the first years of the present century.
It was from about the year 1902 that the history of air
transportation really began. True, balloons were used by
the late Count Zeppelin in our Civil War and also in the
Franco-Prussian War, but the powered aircraft did not
come until Orville Wright's epochal flight in 1903. From
1902 up to the time of the outbreak of the World War
there were two schools of thought. One favored the doc-
trine of "freedom of the air" while the other advocated the
principle of "sovereignty in airspace". Fauchille, the French
writer and lawyer, and a German writer, Dr. F. Meili,
favored the former doctrine while English authorities op-
posed it. The latter contended very strongly that the pres-
ence of any vehicle overhead was always a source of danger
to the lands and waters beneath. The British authorities
thus realized that Justinian's and Queen Elizabeth's pro-
nouncements of "freedom of the air" had not withstood the
acid test of practical application. Here was evidenced the
first indication of the breaking down of the doctrine of
"freedom of the air". The practical problems of the World
War sounded the death knell to the doctrine that the air
is free as is the sea, for soon thereafter the doctrine of air
sovereignty gained the preponderance of the weight of
expert authority. The World War proved that in time of
crises national governments assert their sovereignty in the
airspace over their territory. At the first international
convention held after the war the doctrine of air sover-
eignty was definitely settled. This was the International
Air Navigation Convention held in Europe in October 1919,
and it adopted the provision that the contracting States
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sov-
ereignty in the airspace above its territory and territorial
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waters.9 On May 31, 1920, the United States signed the
Convention but as the Senate has not ratified it, it never
became binding on this country. It appears that in 1913,
at Madrid, Spain, the International Law Association had
adopted the doctrine of air sovereignty but of course it
had not the authority and element of finality because of the
very nature of the organization that adopted it. The con-
vention of 1919 also adopted a provision which accorded the
right of innocent passage by subjects of one sovereignty
over the lands of another but such right is merely a tem-
porary and contractional one which can be revoked when
occasions require its nullification.' 0 Thus came about a
complete abandonment of the principle of "freedom of the
air". Here is seen a tightening and restricting of the use
of airspace. It is now well settled that the sovereignty in
airspace is in the country whose lands and waters are be-
neath. In the United States, the sovereignty in airspace
is in each state, subject to the disputed federal jurisdiction
over interstate aerial navigation.
Many of the states of the Union have by specific legis-
lative enactments declared their sovereignty in the airspace
over the lands and waters within their respective juris-
dictional boundaries. Among those that have so declared
themselves are Pennsylvania*, Vermont, Delaware, Mary-
land, Tennessee, Indiana, Michigan, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Rhode Island and the Terri-
tory of Hawaii. These states have expressed themselves
by stating that the sovereignty in the space above the lands
and waters of the State is declared to rest in the State,
except where granted to and assumed by the United States,
pursuant to a constitutional grant by the people of the
State.1" Michigan and Hawaii omit the exception.1  Other
states have indirectly asserted their sovereignty in airspace
9Article 1.
10Article 2.
*Act of April 25, 1929, P. L. 753, Sec. 3.
-Uniform State Law For Aeronautics, Section 2.
isMichigan 1923, No. 224; Hawaii 1923, Act 109.
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through the enactment of certain statutory provisions with
reference to the operation of aircraft.1 3 Only recently New
York State passed a law which became operative on Sep-
tember 1, 1928 declaring it a crime to navigate an aircraft
while intoxicated. 14 Again it is found that because of our
dual organization of government that the sovereignty in
airspace is divided among the several states, subject to
the possible qualification of control over interstate com-
mercial traffic by the federal government. On account of
this division of power between the federal government and
the states problems in jurisprudence have arisen.
With this digression showing the development of aerial
law first as between nations and then local states, comes
the question of individual proprietorship in airspace by the
owners of the subjacent lands. Pennsylvania*, Vermont,
Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, Nevada, Tennessee and the Territory
of Hawaii have again spoken and enacted a law which
provides that the ownership of space above the lands and
waters of the State is declared to be vested in the several
owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of
flight. 15 Idaho however has eliminated the clause "subject
to the right of flight". 16 Hence there are thirteen states
in the Union that by statutory enactments indirectly in-
dorse, at least in part, the maxim cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos, subject however to the import-
ant limitation of the right of flight in twelve of them. Cali-
fornia, as heretofore stated, has adopted the principle of
the maxim in her civil code. The particular provision states
that the owner of land in fee has the right to the surface
and to everything permanently situated beneath or above
it.17 This with the Idaho Law is another challenge to the
laChapter 233, Laws of New York 1928, General Business Law
240-244.
1'Chapter 408, Laws of 1928, Penal Law 1222.
*Act of April 25, 1929, P. L. 753, Sec. 4.
l6Uniform State Law For Aeronautics, Section 3.
leIdaho 1925, Chapter 92.
1iCalifornia Civil Code, Section 829.
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soundness of the doctrine that the "air is free". Of course
this doctrine was origitially applied as between sovereign
states, but the general expression "the air is free" is being
denied now to persons within political subdivisions, in some
instances. It can be seen readily that there is conflict on
the question among the states. The twelve states which
have conceded the ownership in the airspace to the sub-
jacent land owners subject to the right of flight, as well as
the state of Idaho, have further amplified their position in
the matter by stating that flight in aircraft over the lands
and waters of a state is lawful, unless at such a low altitude
as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land
or water, or the space above the land or water, is put by
the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently
dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or
on the water beneath.18 This restriction of the subjacent
landowner's right of proprietorship in the superincumbent
airspace, it will be recalled, is similar to that imposed by
the German Code.' 9 Idaho's stand in legalizing flight is an
assertion of her police powers, and its legality is open to
question.
If the usque ad coelum principle is still law then the
constitutionality of the provisions of the law of those states
which have specifically declared that the ownership of space
above the land and waters is invested in the owners of
the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight, is open
to serious question because of the limitation "subject to
the right of flight". One must not be unmindful of the
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Federal Constitution which provide, among other things,
that no one shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation therefore. 20  Such
provisions are a part of our Bill of Rights and must be
carefully guarded. Any infringement thereof strikes at
18Uniform State Law For Aeronautics, Section 4.
"LSection 905.
2 0Story v. New York Elevated R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122.
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the very roots and foundation of our governmental struc-
ture. At this juncture it should be borne in mind that
property rights of an individual and the sovereignty of a
State are two distinct concepts. True a state in the ex-
ercise of one of its sovereign powers, viz., that of police,
may authorize the right of flight over the private property
without compensation and the exercise of such govern-
mental function may be due process of law, provided its
very exercise is a proper use of such police powers. In
other words the necessity for evoking such police powers
must exist.2' If there is no such necessity then the use
of police power by a state must not be a guise for circum-
venting or defeating those provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment which prohibit the taking of private property
without compensation or the depriving of one of his prop-
erty without due process of law. If the necessity is said
to exist solely as a matter of expediency, then the question
arises as to whether or not private property rights are to
be regarded so lightly and dismissed so readily. The Sup-
reme Court of the United States has stated that it is the
duty of the courts to avoid encroachments on the constitu-
tion.22 Furthermore that which may be of no consequence
today, insofar as the property owner is concerned, because
of the infrequent passage of aircraft may be of great im-
portance when the use of aircraft becomes more general.
That day is not far off. To-day no one objects to the oc-
casional airplane that passes over his property. This is
true no matter how soured one may be toward his fellow
men. In fact the passing of an aircraft usually arouses
curiosity and sufficient excitement to cause the whole
family to stumble over the house cat and out the back
door to wave a friendly greeting to the aeronaut in flight.
When aircrafts become so numerous however, their fre-
quent passing will cease to be a novelty and if the presence
of planes is so constant as to amount to a nuisance, the
present day friendly attitude may unfortunately turn to
21State of Mo. v. Kansas City Ft. S. & G. R. Co., 32 Fed. 723.
22Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 635.
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one 6f open hostility. Might it not be far wiser to meet
the question of the ownership of the airspace now while it
is not so acute? It certainly would be considerably more
simple and surely would be fairer to aircraft in general.
In justice to aeronautical interest, both financial and in-
dustrial, a policy of submissiveness should not be turned
into one of open obstruction after capital has been heavily
invested and the industry well established. What will be
the condition of mind of the private pilot a year or two
hence when upon embarking on a flight some fine Spring
Sunday morning with his wife and kiddies and perhaps his
mother-in-law, but with good intentions as to her to be
sure, he will learn that his next door neighbor or some
more distant one objects to him passing in flight over their
property? True, if the adjoining neighbor likewise has a
plane there will be reciprocal arrangements. If there are
a number of less fortunate or timid neighbors who do not
possess an airplane, it can be imagined easily the zigzagged
course that our family pilot will be compelled to pursue in
order to proceed with his journey. This calls attention to
the wisdom of encouraging everyone to become airmind-
ed. With such psychological assistance the difficulties of
the situation would be considerable mitigated.
A brief review of some of the judicial decisions to de-
termine what practical application has been given to the
doctrine set forth in the maxim cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos, should prove illuminating. In
a Georgia case it was stated that the owner of realty having
title downwards and upwards indefinitely, an unlawful in-
terference with his rights, below or above the surface,
alike gave him a right of action?. An Iowa court decided
that the placing of one's arm over into the space above
the land of another was a trespass for which one was
liable.24 This court stated that it is one of the oldest rules
of property known to the law that the title of the owner
of the soil extends not only downward to the center of the
23Markham v. Brown, 37 Ga. 277.
24Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457.
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earth but upward usque ad coelum. It was stated -by a
foreign court that it would be reluctant to hold that a
landowner had not the right to object to one putting any-
thing over the owner's land at any height.25 Firing a shot
across the lands of another was ruled an actionable wrong
in Minnesota 26 and English courts. 7 The stringing of tele-
phone and telegraph wires was held to be a trespass by a
New York court.2 8 In this case the Court said that so far
as the case before it was concerned, the plaintiff as the
owner of the soil owned upward to an indefinite extent. In
California it was decided that an owner of land had the
right to cut off the limb of a tree which overhung his prop-
erty, although the tree grew upon the land of another.29 In
this connection a New York Court held that an action for
trespass would lie against one whose trees hung over into
the space of another's property.30 An English court has
decided that an action would lie against one whose horse
kicked into the space over the land of an adjoining owner.
Pollock states that it does not seem possible, on the prin-
ciples of the common law, to assign any reason why an
entry above the surface should not be a trespass. The Law
Journal, London, April 27, 1929 states as follows:-
"To the question, therefore, whether an action for
aerial trespass will lie, no definite answer can be given.
But, as Pollock observes, there seems no reason or
principle why there should not be such a trespass. The
development of civil aviation may bring this aspect of
trespass into prominence and lead to a clarification of
the present obscurity."
On the other hand there have been two quite, recent de-
cisions, one in Pennsylvania and one in Minnesota in which
25Wadsworth Dist. v. United Tel. Co., 13 Q. B. D. 904.
26Whitaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386.
27Clifton v. Bury, 4 T. L. R. 8.
28Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N. Y. 486.
2sGrandona v. Lovdal, 78 Cal. 611.
IoHoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201.
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it was held in effect that an aircraft does not commit a
trespass in passing in flight over the lands of another. In
the Pennsylvania case* an owner of land sued an aeronaut
for trespass because of the noise created in flying over his
property. The Minnesota case also was one for damages
and to enjoin the defendant from flying over plaintiff's
property. In this case" the Court said that the upper air-
space is a natural heritage common to all of the people,
and its reasonable use ought not to be hampered by any
ancient and artificial maxim of law as "Whose the soil
is, his it is from the heavens to the depth of the earth",
and that to apply the rule as contended for would render
lawful air navigation impossible because if the plaintiff
could prevent flights over his land, then every other land
owner could do the same thing. While those two cases
were decided by lower courts they are important because
they have ruled directly on the question of the right of
aircraft to use the superincumbent airspace over the pri-
vate property of others.
For support the proponents of the maxim rely on the
judicial decisions, the maxim itself, its incorporation in va-
rious judicial codes, its acceptance and adoption by expert
legal authorities from Blackstone3 2 and Cooke33 down to
more modern and contemporary authorities. A United
States Senator at one time introduced a bill in Congress
which recognized the private landowner's right to forbid
flight over his property with the right to collect damages
in the event of the violation of such alleged right. The
measure also provided for the right of injunction to prevent
such flights.8 A former committee of the American Bar
Association has stated that it confesses that the maxim
cujus est solum, ejus et usque ad coelum does not in terms at
least admit of the invasion of private right in time of peace
*Comnionwealth v. Nevin and Smith, 2 D. & C. 241.
3IJohnson v. Curtis Northwest Airplae Co. et al. (unreported).
32Blackstone Comm. 4th Edition, 18.
aCoke on Littleton, 4 a.
34Senate 2593, July 1919.
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for military purposes. Another authority on aeronautical
law admits that two of our states treat an aircraft passing
in flight over the ptivate property as a trespasser. Major
Elza C. Johnson while Legal Adviser of the Air Service of
the United States stated that the space above the earth is
ixed and all that belongs to it is private property, to which
the owner is entitled to unmolested enjoyment without
added and unnecessary dangers. That is very strong sup-
port for the usque ad coeluin theory. A quotation or two
of the Major's in an Air Information Circular published by
the Chief of Air Service should prove interesting at this
juncture. He wrote:-
"The navigation of the air must depend entirely
upon the question of who owns the space above the
earth. If the common law rule is recognized that the
space above the earth belongs to the owner of the
earth, then no power exists in the Constitution of either
State or Nation to deprive the individual owner of any
rights to the free use and occupancy of that space as
long as he does not molest the private ownership of
his neighbor. No one has any right to cross his prop-
erty with an airplane and trespass upon his right to
enjoy it without danger or fear of danger."
This is a frank statement from one so closely interested in
the development of aviation. Major Johnson deserves con-
siderable commendation for his courageous stand. He is
whole heartedly for the advancement of aeronautics, but
he believed that it should be developed on a legal founda-
tion along constructive lines rather than by means of make
shift measures and subterfuge. Writing further he said:-
"The basis of all starting of air navigation then
must necessarily be the grant from the individual".
"It is my opinion that the question should be strip-
ped of all camouflage and hope of getting by, and met
squarely as it is. I do not believe that we can long
hide behind the provisions of police power, interstate
commerce, post roads, general welfare, or common de-
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fense, if we do not first settle the individual right and
obtain Federal control of the air".
Major Johnson also stated that any use of the air is un-
authorized and the air is used in the navigation of aircraft,
other than Government, by mere permission which does
not establish either right or jurisdiction; and that even the
Government, other than in war times, would have no in-
herent right to operate aircraft over private property for
carrying mail or military training, and therefore it is highly
desirable to face the situation as it is in order that steps
may be taken to open up avenues of aeronautical interest
sufficient to insure the best results in military and naval
aviation. He further stated that under the present grants
and prohibitions of the Constitution and the common law
rule of ownership of space above property, neither the
United States Government nor the States have any juris-
diction over the air. Major Johnson further wrote:-
"It would appear, and it is my opinion, that steps
should be taken at once to obtain federal control of
the air by direct grant of the people. I am of the
opinion that this must be done before any rights to use
the air exist, notwithstanding the claims to the con-
trary."
There appears to be no reason why the sound law as stated
by Major Johnson a few years ago is not equally sound
law to-day.
Many arguments, ingenious and otherwise, have been
advanced against the proposition that the superincumbent
airspace is not free to aerial navigation. Opponents of the
maxim contend that it is obsolete and has no modern ap-
plication in the light of present inventions and that if air-
craft are to be of any practical use, such ancient and obso-
lete maxims are to be disregarded. Furthermore they con-
tend that if the maxim is to have any application at all it
must be liberally construed. In other words the proprietor-
ship in the overlying airspace insofar as the subjacent own-
ers are concerned is to be limited to such airspace that is ap-
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
purtenant to the land, or stated in other words, the owner-
ship of property extends only as far upward as the necessi-
ties and protection of it require. To that extent and that
only it is claimed the maxim is to receive any application.
It is further asserted that the mere passage of aircraft over
one's lands and waters at such a height as not to interfere
with the use thereof by the owners is not an actionable
wrong. This it will be recalled is the view taken by the
twelve states previously mentioned which have adopted
the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics. It is also stated
that the ownership in the overlying airspace has been lost
by subjacent owners by reason of failure to use the space.
Such claim is certainly highly amusing for without modern
aircraft or the general use of the balloon it is inconceivable
how the upper strata could have been previously used. If
one had so used the upper airspace above his property
would it then be conceded as private property? Carl Zoll-
man in his "Law of the Air" also has advanced the argu-
ment that in the South and West in years gone by no one
ever objected to cattle roaming over one's land which was
not inclosed, therefore an aircraft flying over one's prop-
erty should be free from a claim of trespass. 35 He further
states that no one would complain about a baseball"6 being
thrown across one's land or of one's pigeons 7 or other
birds flying over another's property. This is probably true
if the baseballs and pigeons were not too numerous. So
the analogies run. Some have objected that to strictly
construe the maxim would be to impede the progress of
science arid that therefore strict application should not be
extended to conditions which did not exist when the maxim
was in the process of development. The ancient doctrine
of minerals with reference to the ownership beneath the
surface which limited such ownership is claimed by ana-
logy to apply to the limitation of the ownership of the
airspace by the subjacent owner. Likewise the modern
"5Law of the Air-Zollman p. 16.
36Law of the Air-Zollman p. 20.
37Law of the Air-Zolman p. 21.
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doctrine of the ownership of a vein under another's land
through ownership of its apex, in the law of mines, is
sought to be applied to the superincumbent airspace.38
Under the ancient law of roads the element of passage or
the right to proceed with one's journey was deemed a
superior right over the right of adjacent ownership and con-
sequently if a road was blocked, the traveler had a perfect
right to pass over the property adjoining the road. The
traveler had the right to pass even if in doing so he had
to walk over growing crops. This is presented as another
example of the limitations to which the airspace ownership
is subject. Another analogy is advanced in the private
ownership in the bed of a stream. It is contended that -the
easement or right of the public to pass over the waters,
the bed of which is the private property of another is
identical with the right to pass in flight through the air-
space over private property. The analogy is admittedly a
very excellent one. Another ancient law evoked is the one
which required a property owner to keep his land clear of
bushes for a distance of some two hundred feet on each side
of a highway in order that no highwaymen might be able
to hide behind bushes bordering the road. This is claimed
to be similar to the right to leave free for the passage of
aircraft a certain border or part of the overlying airspace.
The ancient law made the adjacent owner liable to any
person robbed by reason of the highwaymen being offered
a hiding place due to the failure of the owner to keep clear
the strip of land for the required distances. At the risk
of being facetious it might be stated that no mention is
now made by those offering the analogy that if the clouds
are not swept away by the subjacent land owner he might
be liable for any robbery committed by highwaymen navi-
gating in the upper strata. Even the legality of the New
York rent laws is advanced to illustrate the extent to which
private property is subordinated to the public interest and
so in the interest of air navigation the ownership of the
38Report of Special Committee on the Law of Aviation, Amer.
Bar Assn., 1921, p. 19.
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airspace should be so restricted. 9 Also it is pointed out
that the decisions of the courts with the exception of the
Pennsylvania and Minnesota decisions heretofore mcn-*
tioned have applied the latin maxim to airspace only im-
mediately adjacent to the soil and not to the upper air-
space in which aircraft pass in flight. A former committee
on aviation of the American Bar Association has called the
usque ad coelum theory a prepossession and a bugaboo."0
This same committee maintained that it is incumbent upon
private owners to demonstrate the extent of their private
ownership in the upper airspace to the exclusion of com-
mon right. The committee has further stated:--"
"We feel that this committee can do no more
beneficial service to the public and the common interest
of all the people than to challenge the proposition that
it is an invasion of the rights of private ownerships of
property to utilize the air for purpose of flight."
"We feel that the essential interest of air flight
demands that jurists and lawyers should not be led into
any supine concession that our law already invests in
private ownership the the private right to exclude fliers
from the air."
"We cannot too often urge that the extent of
private ownership in the airspace so as to embarrass
public travel through the air is itself a new question
in jurisprudence not to be passed over by concession
or properly solved by indifferently yielding to claims
of private ownership which are not a necessary conse-
quence of principles already recognized in the law ot
private property. 2
The committee concludes with the statement that the ques-
tion of ownership of airspace should be discussed, debated
and yielded only to the extent that the private owner may
39Id. Page 19.




demonstrate according to the accepted tested principles of
jurisprudence that the claim is an essential part of private
property. In an article published in the American Law
Review, Edmund F. Trabue has also reiterated the propo-
sition that the latin maxim in question is applicable only
to such airspace as is appurtenant to the land.43 The late
Simeon E. Baldwin, former Governor of Connecticut and a
high legal authority on aeronautical as well as general law,
stated that the owner of land has no legal right in the air-
space above it except as far as its occupation by others
could be of injury to his property.4 4 Two opposing latin
maxims have been offered to combat the usque ad coelum
doctrine. One is dannum absque injuria which means of
course damage without injury. If one is passing in flight
over the private property of another and causes no damage,
then it is contended that even though the upper airspace
might be conceded to be the property of the subjacent
owner, he has no cause to complain because he suffered no
damage resulting in injury. The other maxim is de minibus
non lex curat. Translated it means the law gives no reward
or damages for insignificant things. It is urged that the
mere passing in an airplane through the airspace at a con-
siderable height is so inconsequential insofar as interfering
with the subjacent owner's use and enjoyment of the land
beneath that no court would be bothered with any trivial
action for damages or trespasses.
Professor George Bogert in an article in the Cornell
Law Review stated, in speaking of the usque ad coelum
rule :
"But, notwithstanding the persistence of the rule,
its application in the space not immediately adjacent to
the soil and structures on the soil is wanting. All the
decisions are regarding intrusion into the space very
43The Law of Aviation, American Law Review, Page 87, Vol.
58, No. 1, 1924.
414 Am. J. Int. L. 95.
"5Problems in Aviation Law, Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. VI,
p. 271.
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near the surface, where the actual use of the soil by
the surface occupant was disturbed. It is believed that
an examination of the cases will show that cujus est
solum is not law, but is merely a nice theory, easily
passed down from medieval days because there has
not been until recently any occasion to apply it to its
full extent."
Opposed to Major Johnson's pronouncements in the
Air Service Information Circular, is a more recent circular
prepared by Captain Rowan A. Greer, likewise of the Judge
Advocate General's Department of the United States Army.
In the circular the Captain has written:
"If the maxim of 'cujus est solum ejus usque ad
coelum' be conceded as the law without limitation of its
broad terms, then it may likewise be conceded that
the conclusions advanced by Major Johnson are logi-
cally sound. However it is respectfully but earnestly
submitted that no court or authority has gone so far
as to announce that this old latin phrase of 'who owns
the soil owns also up to heaven' means that no one has
the right of passage through the air spaces that in no
way interferes with the full enjoyment of the posses-
sion of the subjacent soil and causes no actual damage
to the owner of that soil. A careful examination of
the origin of this maxim shows it merely to have been
the pronouncement in a textbook or treatise of a black-
letter principle. Indeed, until the last quarter of a
century man has not developed any inventions or fa-
cilities that would give rise to the necessity of an ac-
ceptance of this precept in its broadest aspect, and it
is not therefore fair to say that it is a recognized
'common-law rule'."
Here we have two opposing views by officers of the
Judge Advocate General's Department of the United States
Army. It should be here noted however that they do not
differ on the question of who owns the airspace, but only
as to the extent of the subjacent owner's proprietorship in
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the superincumbent airspace. Major Johnson appears to
have gone more exhaustively into the subject, whereas
Captain Greer seems to have been content to accept the
dicta of-well let it be said-the more popular viewpoint.
This is said in no criticism of the Captain however, but on
the contrary it can be stated that his arguments do not
lack the element of consistency. This is something that
cannot be said of a number of the opponents of the usque ad
coelum rule.
If there can be no agreement between the advocates
of the two opposing doctrines, the proposition might be
advanced that the superincumbent airspace is new territory
like some undiscovered lands of the arctic region or some
newly discovered island and therefore the airspace is free
to all of those citizens of the nations whose territories lie
beneath. But of course this proposition presents other
questions. How much of the airspace is free and undis-
covered territory? How much of it is appurtenant to and
wnecessary to the full enjoyment of the private owners of
the land beneath? Who is to decide how much of the sub-
jacent owner's common law right in the space above his
land is to be allowed to him and what part is to be denied
to him? This only brings one back again to the usque ad
coelum maxim. The proposition of newly discovered terri-
tory and the questions that arise therefrom illustrate that
for all practical present day purposes the problem is one
of degree. In other words where is the line of demarca-
tion to be drawn and at what height is the exclusive right
of-possession by the subjacent owner to terminate?
Some opponents of the maxim who attack it on the
ground that it is ancient and obsolete, in their contention
that the air is free, themselves evoke other ancient and
obsolete maxims. In one statement they say that an owner
of land has no proprietorship in the superincumbent air-
space and in the next statement they admit indirectly that
he has such ownership by advancing such doctrines as the
ancient law of roads, ownership of minerals, the public
easement of the use of navigable waters and others as
well as legal maxims which have been mentioned pre-
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viously. Through their indirect admissions by their ap-
plication of analogies they admit proprietorship by the land
owners in the superincumbent airspace, but in fairness it
should be observed that such indirectly admitted ownership
is restricted and limited. To some extent this has been the
reasoning of the committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion in spite of some of its utterances heretofore quoted.
This is not offered as a criticism but is submitted as proof
that after all there is not such a great difference of opinion
between the two schools of thought on the question of
ownership of the upper airspace by the subjacent owners. A
careful analysis of the contentions on both sides of the
proposition will disclose the fact that ownership is ad-
mitted either directly or indirectly, but with the important
distinction made by those opposed to the usque ad coelum
theory that ownership is limited to those uses which are
appurtenant to the land and to the full enjoyment thereof.
In other words ownership is limited to the zone of effective
possession. This it will be recalled is the position taken
by those states that have adopted the Uniform State Law
For Aeronautics."G
Likewise this stand is in accord with the civil code of
the various nations previously noted. In other words pri-
vate owners own the airspace above their property subject
to the right of flight and the non-interference with any use
they may choose to make of their property. Of course
this limitation is a significant one. No one can foretell or
possesses a vision sufficiently keen that he can prophesy
in the least what new scientific inventions may be in use
within the next quarter of a century or less, that in the
use thereof in connection with one's land may conflict in
no small degree with the theory of the right of flight. It
is for this very reason that fundamental property rights
should not be too readily cast aside. That which may be
denied to subjacent owners to-day may be an urgent ne-
cessity to them and the world in general tomorrow. Even
with reference to modern structures, only recently the
46Uniform State Law For Aeronautics, Section 4.
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president of one of the foremost engineering and construc-
tion concerns stated that two hundred-story buildings
offered no structural engineering impossibilities and that
engineers welcomed an opportunity to design such struc-
tures. While the zone of effective possession of the upper
air strata may to-day be but five hundred to one thousand
feet, with two hundred-story structures such zone will
embrace the airspace up to twenty-five hundred feet. With
the passage of time and new developments the ultimate
zone of effective possession may reach to five thousand or
even ten thousand feet. No one can actually predict the
future and attempt to place any limitation with respect to
future physical possibilities. Great as are the benefits to
be derived by mankind through the use of aircraft, and
those benefits cannot be exaggerated or their full scope
prophecised, yet who can deny that some invention may
yet arise within the lives of the next generation or two
which may be a far greater benefit to mankind than is that
of aeronautics. If the needs of the one conflict with the
other the weaker must yield. As a means of local travel
the horse-drawn vehicle and the bicycle have become al-
most extinct. Who would have dared to predict that thirty
years ago? Who can tell what is the future of the motor
car now that the airplane is here? The ultimate vehicle
may be a combination automobile and airplane that will
permit of both air and land travel.
The provision of the Air Commerce Act providing
that the airspace above the minimum safe altitude of flight
prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce shall be subject
to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air
navigation in conformity with the requirements of the
Act,47 has not settled the question as to what extent the
legal maxim usque ad coelum etc., is to have legal applica-
tion in the light of the development of modern air naviga-
tion. Through the alleged power of the Commerce Clause
in the Federal Constitution, the aforementioned provisions
of the Air Commerce Act do however attempt to assert the
6TSection 180.
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right of freedom of aerial navigation for interstate and
foreign commerce purposes superior to the right of sub-
jacent landowners to use the airspace to any extent or
degree which may interfere or conflict with the use thereof
by interstate and foreign air commerce. The legality of
this assertion of the right of freedom of aerial navigation
for interstate and foreign commerce is not to go unchal-
lenged.4" The theory, of course, is that Congress has the
power under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Consti-
tution to regulate all foreign and interstate commerce
whether it be on the water, on the land, or in the airspace.
Also has been advanced the analogy that the Supreme
Court of the United States has regarded the right of the
owner of shore or submerged land as being restricted to the
superior right of the public in general, and as the result the
United States may assert its right against individual own-
ers of land in the interest of interstate and foreign air
commercial navigation. In this connection the United
States Supreme Court has decided that the right to im-
prove navigation is paramount to the riparian owner's
right of access to a stream.49 Consequently it evoked the
Commerce Clause, that "cure all" for all doubtful legisla-
tive action. Congress's power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce through the medium of the Commerce
Clause is subject to the limitation of other provisions of the
Federal Constitution. 0 Reference is made particularly to
the Fifth Amendment, and which it will be recalled provides
in part that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law nor shall private
property be taken for public use without compensation.
Whether or not the provisions of the Air Commerce Act
in providing that the airspace over private property is free
to interstate and foreign air navigation, is depriving one of
his property without due process of law and is an un-
"Story v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122.
49Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141.
60U. S. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 164 Fed. 215; Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312.
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warranted exercise of federal power are questions for very
serious consideration. On this latter proposition the
Special Committee on the Law of Aviation of the American
Bar Association has stated:
"The Constitution neither expressly delegates to
the United States powers over air flight as such nor
prohibits them to the states; presumptively, therefore,
they still reside either with the states or the people,
but they do not reside with the United States nor with
Congress."
"While we also recognize that as incidental to the
power to lay taxes, or to regulate interstate or foreign
commerce, or to pass laws to carry out the provisions
of treaties, or in the exercise of other specific powers,
Congress may legislate respecting air flight, we also
recognize that without an unprecedented extension of
the claims of the exercise of constitutional power, and
unprecedented judicial recognition of an unprecedented
claim, there can be no complete control of the subject
matter by national legislation."
It will be recalled that this same committee opposed
the usque ad coelum doctrine. Their objection however to
the application of the Commerce Clause to aerial naviga-
tion is on other constitutional grounds and has nothing to
do with the question whether or not subjacent owners have
proprietorship in the superincumbent airspace. This directs
attention to the fact that federal control of aerial naviga-
tion not only involves the question whether or not private
property rights are being invaded under the usque ad coelum
doctrine, but it raises the additional questiofi whether such
assumption of power by the federal government is not
an encroachment on the sovereign powers of the individual
states. The Federal Constitution provides that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution or
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people." It has been held that the
510th Amendment.
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sovereignty of a state embraces the power to execute its
laws and the right to exercise supreme dominion and au-
thority except as limited by the fundamental law. 2 Also
it has been ruled that, speaking generally, the police pow-
er is reserved to the state because there is no grant
thereof to Congress. 8 In the exercise of police powers by
a state, it has the authority to regulate, among other things,
matters which promote public peace, comfort and con-
venience. 54 It will be recalled that Major Johnson con-
tended that the United States Government had no jurisdic-
tion over the air under the Constitution. But if the Air
Commerce Act is constitutional and authorizes the control
by the federal government over interstate and foreign
commercial aerial navigation, what about the legality of
intra-state and non-commercial aerial navigation in those
states which have not authorized flight through statutory
enactment or otherwise? If the aircraft which is engaged
in interstate commerce is not to be treated as a tresasser
for flying over private property, are the commercial crafts
which confine their flights within the boundary of a state
and the private aeronaut who flies from state to state
to be regarded as committing a trespass everytime they
pass in flight over the same private property? Can the
subjacent landowners enjoin the intrastate commercial
pilot and the private pilot who may or may not fly out of
the state for passing over their lands and waters? If such
designated pilots do so are they to be subjected to damage
claims? Why this discrimination? Why make fish of one
and flesh of another? Is there any justification for the
distinction? Is a penalty to be imposed upon private
and intrastate commercial flying? Such are the legal
day. The law must be clarified. Something must be radi-
cally wrong with our system of jurisprudence which legal-
izes interstate commercial flights but which leaves the law
pertaining to th6 private pilot and the commercial aircraft
52People v. Tool, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198.
- Keller v. U. S., 213 U. S. 138.
54Boston Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25.
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which confines its activities within the boundaries of a
state, in an unsettled and confused condition. True the
Air Traffic Rules of the Air Commerce Regulations apply
to all air traffic, whether commercial or non-commercial,
intrastate or interstate, domestic or foreign." But the
rules regulate only the method of flight and not the right
to fly. If this chaotic condition is to continue for any
length of time aeronautical progress will be greatly im-
peded. Baseball in America is so universally popular be-
cause anyone may play who chooses. It knows no dis-
crimination. No activity gains universal popularity which
does not permit of nationwide participation by every able-
bodied inhabitant. If the Air Commerce Act, by virtue of
the power in the Commercial Clause, can survive the acid
test of legality, then it would seem that the legality of in-
trastate and non-commercial air navigation over the private
property of others might sustain some foundation through
the decisions of our highest courts which have stated that
Congress may lawfully affect intrastate commerce so far
as necessary to regulate effectually and completely inter-
state commerce. 56 The federal governmnt has not assumed
this power except as to the air traffic rules. This is prob-
ably because of the reluctance to interfere with the police
powers of the states.5"
The American Bar Association Special Committee
favored at the time of its existence an amendment to the
Federal Constitution giving federal control over aero-
nautics. Former Assistant Secretary of Commerce William
P. MacCracken, Jr., and who was in charge of the Aero-
nautics Branch of the Department of Commerce was a
member of the committee. It stated as follows:
"And in our judgment the unquestionable method
is a constitutional amendment conferring the power on
.Congress to legislate respecting aeronautics and aero-
graphy. Any other method will be the method of in-
5rAir Commerce Regulations, Sec. 73.
56U. S. v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 321.
UTKeller v. U. S., 213 U. S. 138.
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direction, subterfuge and consequent conflict; and such
indirect methods, though they appear to have been the
methods of national growth in our body politic, are
fraught with the danger, which is constantly manifest,
of practical repeal by aggression and in an uncon-
stitutional way of those constitutional limitations,
which are our fundamental bill of rights-the main
feature of that monument of our institutions, the Con-
stitution."
"While we are in entire accord with the view that
independent and conflicting state legislation will hamp-
er the development of aviation, we see in this no con-
stitutional excuse for assuming unconstitutional pow-
ers or for making unconstitutional use of existing pow-
ers. In our judgment it points to the necessity of con-
stitutional amendment."
"The interest of aeronautics demands that the
power of the federal government shall be extended
(but by constitutional amendment) to this subject
matter, they (the members of the committee) do not
regard the existence of the subject matter as sufficient
excuse for ignoring either the Constitution or the
States."
"Constitutional problems and fundamental theories
respecting an indestructible union of indestructible
states, each operating within its own sphere of sov-
ereignty, with the national government a government
of delegated powers and all other powers reserved to
the states or the people, make no appeal to those who
are impatient to see the actual commercial develop-
ment of air flight and who recognize, or think they
recognize, its possibilities; and who also recognize that
the economic barriers now existing to such develop-
ment are barriers whose foundation is law, or un-
certainty of law, or absence of law."
The prounouncements of the Committee were made several
years ago, but if they were correct exposition of the con-
stitutional phases of the question then they are equally
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sound to-day. Both Major Johnson and the Committee are
in accord on the question that it is expedient that the fed-
eral government have entire control over air navigation
and both favored the constitutional amendment to that
effect. Major Johnson in addition desired that the indi-
vidual citizen should grant by vote to their states the
authority to approve a constitutional amendment giving to
the United States the absolute control over all airspace
above some uniform distance from the earth. A subse-
quent joint committee representing the American Bar As-
sociation and the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws declared that agitation in favor of a consti-
tutional amendment granting to the Federal Government
exclusive jurisdiction over all aeronautics would be apt to
impede needed legislation. Later on a Committee on the
Law of Aeronautics of the American Bar Association of
which the Honorable William P. MacCracken, Jr., was
chairman, recommended to the Association that until Con-
gress has enacted legislation fostering and regulating aero-
nautics, and until the Supreme Court has determined the
extent of federal control over aeronautics, no further con-
sideration should be given to the question of a constitu-
tional amendment to vest exclusive jurisdiction over aero-
nautics in the federal government. This recommendation
was approved by the Association. It will be recalled that
former Assistant Secretary of Commerce MacCracken was
a member of the Special Committee on the Law of Aviation
of the American Bar Association whose decided pronounce-
ments on the desirability of a constitutional amendment
have been heretofore quoted. This is said in no criticism
of the Assistant Secretary, but clearly emphasizes the wis-
dom of proceeding slowly and in accordance with funda-
mental law.
It has been suggested that there may be difficulty in
securing the ratification of a constitutional amendment by
the necessary thirty-six states. If this opposition proves
too formidable resort should be made to the power of
eminent domain. That is the states or the federal govern-
ment, should, through condemnation proceedings acquire
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from private owners with just compensation, sufficient air-
space for well defined airways. No necessity exists for ac-
quiring the airspace above all the lands and waters but only
a sufficient portion thereof for airways. In the interest of
safety for both the public and the aeronaut, airways axle
to be the ultimate paths for aerial navigation. Opposition
to this has been made on the ground that aircraft in flight
cannot always because of storms, fogs and high altitudes
maintain their course over airways. Through recent in-
ventions and those in the process of experimentati6n this
difficulty will be largely overcome. Furthermore airways
of a mile or more in width will not be difficult to adhere
to under ordinary circumstances. It is realized that the
acquiring of necessary airspace for airways through con-
demnation proceedings is not without its difficulties. Equal-
ly difficult are the obstacles to be met with reference to
endeavoring to secure a constitutional amendment but the
difficulties to be met under both situations are not in-
surmountable. Furthermore the problems must be solved
in one way or another. If the process of eminent domain
is less difficult such should be pursued. Better not delay
until the situation becomes too acute.
With certain portions of the airspace acquired through
eminent domain, the only remaining problem left is that of
supervision and control. At the present time the state and
federal governments have assumed concurrent control over
aerial navigation. Under the assumed power, the federal
government now effectively controls interstate and foreign
aerial navigation and the states control intrastate and non-
commercial flights. However as previously mentioned the
United States might be able to assume control of intrastate
navigation as an incidence to the effective control of inter-
state and foreign air commerce. This it will be recalled the
federal government does now with respect to air traffic
rules. However, through uniform regulations by the states
there should be no difficulty insofar as control by the states
is concerned. In fact the thirteen states which have adopt-
ed the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics have thus far
taken uniform action. Furthermore a number of the states,
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New York-8 and New Jersey59 for instance, have adopted
the federal laws for the supervision of pilots and aircraft.
'Eventually however in order to secure uniformity of con-
trol over air navigation there should be adopted by all' of
the states the same rules and regulations as- those pro-
mulgated by the federal authorities.
The situation of aeronautical law at the present time
finds the federal government through the Air Commerce
Act acting under the doubtful authority of the Commerce
Clause of foreign commercial aerial navigation and all navi-
gation whether commercial or non-commercial, interstate
or intrastate insofar as air traffic rules are concerned. On
the other hand most of the states have assumed control
over certain phases of intrastate aerial navigation through
the exercise of their respective police powers.8 But if the
common law rule of unrestricted ownership in the super-
incumbent airspace by the subjacent land owners is still
law, then neither the federal nor the state governments
have any authority to authorize flight of aircraft over
private property.
In justice to aeronautics the law should not be left
in this unsettled state. Obviously there are very serious
legal problems that must be solved. The law. should not
remain in any befogged condition. Only complete clarifica-
tion will suffice. The policy in the past to some extent
at least has been to take the easiest road, to legalize flight
regardless of fundamental and vested property rights and
constitutional restrictions. Indirection and invasion are
only makeshifts at best. True, the progress of aeronautics
should receive every encouragement and nothing should be
done to retard its advancement. Evry red-blooded Ameri-
can should become "air-minded" and give at least his moral
""New York 1928, Chap. 233.
59New Jersey 1928, Chap. 63.
60Connecticut 1927, Chap. 324; Arkansas 1927, Act: 17; Colorado
1927, H. B. 79; Kansas 1921, Chap. 264; Louisiana 1926, Act 52; Maine
1925, Chap. 185; Mass. 1925, Act 189, Sec. 41-59; Michigan 1927, Act
1A Pa. 1M, P. L,. 724; Wyoming 1927, Ctap. 72.
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support to the progress of the art. The advancement of
aeronautics is to the enrichment of the country as well as a
very potential arm of national defense. But virile young in-
dustry as it is, it is in need of no easy road to progress. In
its limited 'years of life it has met many almost insur-
mountable obstacles and it has overcome them. Let it
not be made weak and sterile insofar as its legal phases
are concerned just because a certain mode of procedure may
be the least difficult one. Better meet the problem square-
ly at this time than to work a severe hardship upon a ma-
tured industry in later years by undermining it through
legal entanglements. Far better that aeronautics grow
up with established legal rights than in opposition to them.
Within twenty-five years a body of law, both case and
statutory, will be developed around aeronautics which will
be far more comprehensive than any body of law with re-
lation to any other activity. This will be so because of
the very extensive nature, literally as well as figuratively,
of aeronautics. Such law must not be obstructive but con-
structive. It must not be clouded through legal complexi-
ties. It shall be a beacon of enlightenment and guidance.
In the meantime, with the conflicting legal opinions, dual
control over aeronautics by the states and the federal gov-
ernments, the multiplicity of and variation in state laws, the
apparent confusion in judicial decisions, what is Mr. Av-
erage American Citizen going to do about the question of
the ownership of the airspace?
JOHN A. EUBANK
